Reciprocal Preferences in Matching Markets
Author | : Timm Opitz |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 0 |
Release | : 2023 |
ISBN-10 | : OCLC:1378807244 |
ISBN-13 | : |
Rating | : 4/5 (44 Downloads) |
Download or read book Reciprocal Preferences in Matching Markets written by Timm Opitz and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Agents with reciprocal preferences prefer to be matched to a partner who also likes to collaborate with them. In this paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for mechanism design. Formally, the preferences of an agent can depend on the preferences of potential partners and there is incomplete information about thepartners' preferences. We find that there is no stable mechanism in standard two-sided markets. Observing the final allocation of the mechanism enables agents to learn about each other's preferences, leading to instability. However, in a school choice setting with one side of the market being non-strategic, modified versions of the deferred acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and their implications for efficient information and mechanism design.