Download or read book Essays on Central Bank Communication written by Sherry Wu and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this thesis, I study several topics about central bank communication. I first formalize Blinder's (2004) conjecture that modern central banks may have become too market-friendly. In equilibrium, the central bank optimally displays excess dependency on financial market signals, beyond the level that a social planner concerned with ensuring financial stability. This result suggests that the central bank is better off committing to a set of norms and an institutional culture that is more market-insensitive. Second, I explore the debate among policymakers whether central banks should publish their policy rate forecasts. My analysis shows that releasing those forecasts is always loss-reducing for the central bank, provided its information is at least as precise as that of market forecasters. Finally, I prove that disclosing information to select audiences between scheduled monetary policy meetings facilitates gradualism. Not only does the model provide a formalization of Cieslak et al. (2019), but it also identifies conditions under which information leakage by the central bank improves societal well-being.